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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH
---0000000---

CITY OF SOUTH SALT LAKE,
A Municipal Corporation
Plaintiff and Respondent:
vs.

DEBBIE L. , HANNA

Case No. 17081

Defendant and Appellant:
---0000000---

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
---0000000---

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
Appellant appeals from a conviction of a violation of
§3B-8~5(3)

of the Revised Ordinances of the City of South

Salt Lake (1974 as amended) which ordinance Appellant
claims is unconstitutional and invalid.

-DISPOSITION

IN THE LOWER COURT

This Class B Misdemeanor was first prosecuted in the
South Salt Lake Justice Court and was tried without a jury
before Judge, George H. Searle on January 15, 1980.· The
conviction

in that trial was appealed on February 5, 1980,

and the matter was retried before a jury on March 28, 1980.
This trial resulted in a second conviction and a judgment
on that conviction by Judge Christine M. Durham.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment of conviction
and a determination that the ordinance of the City of South
Salt Lake under which she was convicted is unconstitutional
and invalid.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant was employed, on October 17, 1979, as a
masseur in a massage establislunent and health studio known
as The King's Palace, located at 60 West 3300 South, in the
City of South Salt Lake, Salt Lake County.

On that evening,

Officer James L. Burns, a Salt Lake Vice Officer on duty as
a special officer of the South Salt Lake Police Department
entered the premises and purchased a massage.

Officer Burns

testified that during the course of the massage, he stated to
the Defendant that he had expected something different from
what he was getting, and specifically that in previous massage
parlor encounters, the masseuse had been nude.

He then test·

if ied that the Defendant stated that there were "extras
available" and that for $20.00 he could receive a "local".
He testified that it was his experience that a ''local" was
•
a massage of the genitals. The Defendant was plaGed under
arrest by Officer Burns and others on the premises of The
King's Palace for alleged violation of §3B-8-5(3) of the
Revised Ordinances of the City of South Salt Lake (1974 as
amended) which states that "it shall be unlawful for a
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masseur to touch or offer to touch or massage the genitalia
of customers."

Section 3B-8-8 of the Revised Ordinances of

the City of South Salt Lake ·goes on to make such a violation
a class B misdemeanor.
Prior to jury trial in the Third Judicial District Court,
Defendant was previously found guilty in the Justice Court of
the City of South Salt Lake, sitting without a jury.
appeal was taken from that decision.

An

Prior to the first trial,

a motion to dismiss based on the invalidity of the subject
ordinance was presented to the Justice Court in writing,
accompanied by a memorandum in support thereof, which motion
was denied.

A similar motion was made in the Third Judicial

District Court prior to trial in the instant case, and that
Court refused to hear oral arguments on the matter before
denying it, based upon the prior decision of the Third Judicial
District Court, Judge Homer F. Wilkinson presiding, denying
declaratory relief against the same ordinance, based also
upon its invalidity.

The accompanying motion to dismiss

the charge because of entrapment on the part of the police
officer was also denied by the Third Judicial Di$trict Court,
after a hearing thereon.

The previous attempt to have this
I

f

ordinance declared invalid in a declaratory judgment action
is now pending before this Court in Hollingsworth vs. City of
South Salt Lake, Case No. 16831.

The arguments to follow are

in large part based upon arguments set forth in appellants'
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brief in the previous matter.

ARGlll1ENT
POINT I
.SECTION 3B-8-5(3) OF THE REVISED ORDINANCES OF SOUTH
SALT LAKE IS INVALID AS EXCEEDING THE DELEGATED AUTHORITY
GIVEN TO CITIES BY ARTICLE XI SECTION 5 OF THE CONSTITUTION
OF UTAH AND SUBSEQUENT ACTS OF THE UTAH LEGISLATURE.

IN

ADDITION, THIS SECTION VIOLATES ARTICLE I SECTION 24 OF

THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.
The Constitution of the State of Utah, in Article XI,
Section 5 grants cities "the authority to exercise all powers
relating to municipal affairs, and to adopt and enforce within its limits, local police, sanitary and similar regulations
not in conflict with the general law . . . •

11

(emphasis added)

To this is added the language of Article I Section 24 stating
that "All laws of a general nature shall have uniform
operation."

Obviously allowing cities to pass ordinances

changing the effect of general state laws within the boundaries would render these laws less than uniform in operation.
This the Constitution forbids.

The legislature has enum-

erated what these powers are in §10-8-1 et seq.

u.q.A.

In

Salt Lake City vs. Sutter, 61 U. 533, 216 P. 234 (Utah 1923)
this Court ruled that the legislature does have the power
to enumerate powers of cities, and that all powers and

rnunicipalities are derived from the legislature.
Section 10-8-41 U.C.A. states that cities:
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. . . may supress and prohibit the keeping
of disorderly houses, houses of ill fame or
assignation, or houses kept by, maintained
for, or resorted to or used by, one or more
persons for acts of perversion, lewdness or
prostitution within the limits of the city
and within three miles of the outer bounderies thereof, and may prohibit resorting thereto for any of the purposes aforesaid; they may
also make it unlawful for any person to commit
or of fer or agree to commit an act of sexual
intercourse for hire, lewdness or moral perversion within the city, or for any person to
secure, induce, procure, offer or transport to
any place within the city any person for the
purpose of committing an act of sexual intercourse for hire, lewdness or moral perversion,
or for any person to receive or of fer or
agree to receive or direct any person into
any place or building within the city for
the purpose of connnitting an act of sexual
intercourse for hire, lewdness or moral
perversion, or for any person to aid, abet
or participate in the connnission of any of
the foregoing; and they may also stress and
prohibit gambling houses and gambling, lotteries and all fraudulent devices and practices,
and all kinds of gaming, playing at dice or
cards, and other games of chance, and the sale,
distribution or exhibition of obscene or lewd
publications, prints, pictures or illustrations.
Section 10-8-51.U.C.A. gives the city further powers in
the area of prostitution, as follows:
This may provide for the punislunent of tramps,
street beggars, prostitutes, habitual disturbers
of the peace, pickpockets, gamblers and thieves,
or persons who practice a~y game, trick or device
with intent to swindle.
I

In addition to the statutes cited, §10-8-84 U.C.A. states:
They may pass all ordinances and rules, and
make all regulations, not repugnant to law,
necessary for carrying into effect or discharging
all powers and duties conferred by this chapter,
and such as are necessary and proper to provide
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for the safety and preserve the health, and
promote the prosperity, improve the mora~s,
peace and good order, comfort and convenience
of the city and the inhabitants thereof, and
for the protection of property therein; and
may enforce obedience to such ordinances with
such fines or penalties as they may deem proper;
provided, that the punishment of any offense
shall be by fine in any sum less than $300.00
or by imprisonment not to exceed 6 months, or
by both such fine and imprisonment.
(emphasis
added).
These three statutes were cited by the City of Salt Lake as
authority for passing the ordinance at issue in the case of
Salt Lake City vs. Allred, 19 U.2d 254, 430 P.2d 371 (Utah
1967).

Defendant in that case was convicted of violating

a city ordinance by "aiding and abetting in the connnission
of a crime in that the Defendant directed a police officer
to a certain apartment to obtain sexual intercourse for
hire."

430 P.2d at 372.

There as here, the ordinance was attacked as being
beyond the power of the city, under the grant of authority
given them by the legislature.

The Court, in answer to that

question, in specifically referring to the three statutes
already cited by Defendant stated:
It will be noted that the first two of the statutes
above referred to deal with prostitution . . While
the' ordinance we are considering contains no
definitions of the terms used therein, nevertheless,
it is quite evident that the ordinance was not
designed to deal with prostitution. ~The generally
accepted definition of rostitution is the ractice
o a ema e o erin
er o
to in iscriminate
sexua intercourse with men. The ordinance in
ruestion goes beyond the grant of power by the
e islature to the cities to SU ress rostitution.
30 P. d at 37 . Emphasis a e
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Further, the Court stated that:
It is elementary that municipalities are limited
by express grants of power from the legislature
or as necessarily implied from such grants. It
ap~ears that the ordinance we have under consideration goes beyond the grant that any legislative
authority granted to the city and is therefore
invalid. 430 P.2d at 373.
The Court held for Defendant, but later reversed itself, on
a petition for rehearing (See Salt Lake City vs. Allred 20
U.2d 298, 437 P.2d 434 (Utah 1968)) when one Justice disqualified himself, allowing a District Court Judge to sit.
The Court appeared then to change its mind on the construetion of §10-8-84 U.C.A. and stated that it gave the city much
wider power than those
U.C.A.

pow~rs

given by §§10-8-41 and 10-8-51

Judge Cowley, now speaking for the Court stated:
It is a well settled rule that it is a proper
exercise of the police power as set forth in
th~ above statute to preserve and protect the
public morals, and any practice of business
which has a tendency to weaken or corrupt the
morals of those who follow it, as shown by
experience, is such conduct as affects the public
morals. 437 P.2d at 435.
We are of the opinion that the general police
power is a sufficient grant of authority to
authorize the city ordinance involved in this
case unless."Krohibited

tent flierewit ."

~statute~

inconsis-

437 P.20 at 436 (emphasis added)

This language, of course, must be viewed somewhat cautiously,
as it was done in a sharply divided case, with a District Court
Judge deciding the balance of power, and was decided well before
other cases appearing to cut back sharply on the power which the
Allred Court allowed the city to exercise.

Those cas·es will be

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-8-

cited further on in this brief.

In addition, the Court relied,

in its decision in Allred, on the absence of conflict between
the state statute and the city ordinance, and the harmony
between them.

There is no such harmony in this case.

Further,

there are observations in the dissents of the two Justices who
had previously been in the majority, worth presenting.

Justice

Tuckett stated:
I dissent. After carefully co11sidering the main
opinion and the legal problems raised by this appeal,
I am constrained to adhere to the position taken
in the prior opinion of the court. I do not agree
that the general grant of police power to the
cities by §10-8-84, U.C.A. (1953) was intended
by the legislature to authorize adoption of the
ordinance we are here concerned with. It would
seem that had the legislature intended such broad
powers it would not have made specific grants of
power to cities to deal with certain aspects of
prostitution as provided for by §10-8-41 and
§10-8-51, U.C.A. (1953). The latter statutes
would be unnecessary and superfluous. 437 P.2d
at 438.
Justice Henriod, supporting Justice Tuckett, stated:
The two dissenters in the former case cast their
lot entirely under title 10-8-41, U.C.A. (1953).
The author of the opinion in the present case pays
no attention to those votes but bases his conclusion entirell on title 10-8-84, U.C.A. (1953), and
does not ass gn 10-8-41 as a basis for his conclusion. It would seem to me that this new departure
amounts to a dissent from the dissenters. Under
such circumstances it appears to be sort of an
aff!rmance, not reversal of the former case.
437 P.2d at 438.
In the fonner case Mr. Justice Tuckett simply said
what every lawyer should know, that cities cannot
exercise powers not delegated to them by the state
of its constitution. Each Justice soundly and
fundamentally said that the subject ordinance
(32-1-1) was an attempt to exercise a power not
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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so delegated.
In the second Allred

decision, the Court ruled that the

ordinance in question prohibited an act intimately associated
with prostitution

and~

that the city, in aiding the state in

stopping prostitution, could make the one extra step to make
it more difficult for prostitution to flourish.
not doing that· here.

The city is

They are, instead, making a new class

of sexual offense and the ordinance, as will be shown, is
not only out of harmony and inconsistent with the statute,
it is in direct conflict with it.
Since the Allred

decisions, this Court has had several

occasions to rule on· the powers of municipalities to make
ordinances in-be same· area regulated by the state.

The Court

has uniformally ruled that if the state is already regulating
that area of the law, ·the city should not be involved.

In

State vs. Salt Lake city, 445 P.2d 691 (Utah 1968) this Court
ruled invalid an ordinance of Salt Lake City licensing private
non-profit social clubs.

The city had simply copied the state

licensing requirement, changing only enough words to make it
apply to city officers, rather than state officers.

The Court

quoted extensively from Abbott vs. City of Los Angeles, 3 Cal.
Rptr.

158, 349 P.2d 974 {€al. 1960) in stating that
\

the invalidity arises, not from conflict of language,
but from the inevitable conflict of jurisdiction which
would result from.dual regulations covering the same
ground. Only by such a broad definition of 'conflict'
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is it possible to confine local legislation to its
proper field of supplementary regulation. 44SP.2d
at 694.
In Allgood vs. Larsen, 545 P.2d 530 (Utah 1976) the
Defendant was convicted of a violation of §32-3-3 of the Revised
Ordinances of Salt Lake City. That ordinance made the crime
of trespass a class B misdemeanor.

Section 76-6-206(3) of the

Utah Code made the same crime an infraction, for which no
jail sentence could be imposed.

The criminal Defendant success-

fully obtained a Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Third Judicial
District Court, and that Writ was upheld by this Court.

The

Court, in upholding the Writ, declared:
The District Court ruled that "since the state
law provides no jail sentence for trespass, which
is classified as an 'an infraction,' that the
city cannot impose a greater sentence than that
provided by state law, and it is for that reason
that the Court grants the petition ofr a Writ
of Habeas Corpus." With this we agree and affirm
the trial Court.

Further, the Court quoted from McQuillian,
Corporations,

~nicipal

§17.15, at page 326, in declaring the law in

. . . if the.ordinance penalty conflicts with
that· of the general law of the state covering
the same subject, the ordinance penalty is void
The charter ordinance penalty cannot exceed that
of the state law. 545 P.2d at 532.
Justice Crockett in dissent stated as follows:
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The legislature has specifically granted authority
to the city to prohibit criminal trespass by
§10-8-50, Utah Code Annotated 1953, wherein it
states that cities have the power to:
. . . rovide for the unishment of tres ass
and such ot er petty o enses as the oard of
conunissioners or city council may deem proper.
545 P.2d at 532 .
..

In other words, the majority of the Court ruled that a
City may not decide the punishment of a crime, when that
punishment appears to conflict with the state pronouncement
on the same subject, even though there is a specific grant
of authority for so setting the penalty.

The state, then,

by making a later pronouncement of public policy, is deemed
to have overruled its earlier pronouncement that cities
exercise

spec~fic

grants of power.

has defined the perimeters of

~hat

In this case, the state
is and is not illegal

sexual conduct, and any previous grant of power to the
city, is not sufficient to override -what the state has
pronounced.
In the case of Layton City vs. Speth, 5-78 P.2d 828
(Utah 1978) Defendant was convicted under a city ordinance
which duplicated the

langu~ge

of §58-37-8(2)(ii) which

stated that it shall be unlawful:
For any owner, tenant, licensee, or person
in -control of any building, room, 'tenement,
vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place,
knowlingly and intentionally to permit the
same to be occupied by persons unlawfully
possessing, using, or distributing controlled
substances therein.
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strict construction of the statutes granting legislative
authority to the cities which characterized the earlier
opinion in Salt Lake City vs. Allred, ruled the ordinance
must be set aside, in the following language:
At the time of the alleged offense the statutes
of Utah permitted cities certain powers including
a prohibition against " . • . the sale, giving
away or furnishing of intoxicating liquors or
narcotics, or of tobacco to any person under 21
years of age: . . . The statute has since been
amended but the amendment has no bearing on the
present case.
Cities are also empowered by statute to pass
all ordinances, rules, and regulations for
carrying into effect all powers and duties
conferred and "such as are necessary and
proper to provide for the safety and preserve
the health, and promote prosperity, !mprove
the morals, peace and good order, comfort
and convenience of the city and the inhabitants thereof, . . .
The ordinance in question is not one which
is necessary for carrying into effect any of
the purposes above mentioned. 578 P.2d at 829.
While, then, the second Allred decision appeared to give
cities a grant of authority to protect safety, health, morals,
peace and good order, comfort and convenience of the city, which
grant of authority was in addition to the many specified grants,
the Layton City vs. Speth decision, appears to make. that position untenable.

In fact, in that decision, the Court very

clearly made a rather strict interpretation of what the city
can and cannot do in the area of drugs.

The Court clarified
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its view of city powers even further, in stating:
By the statute it is clear that the only
authority given to the city was to prohibit
anyone from selling, giving away, or furnishing marijuana to a person under 21 years of
age. Mr. Speth is not charged with doing any
of those unlawful acts; and that part of the
ordinance which attempts to make it unlawful
for an owner of an automobile, knowingly and
intentionally, to permit persons to occupy it
and possess, use, or distribute marijuana must
be held to be beyond the power of the city to
enact. The ordinance is, therefore, invalid.
578 P.2d at 829.
Although the Court then went on to determine that there was
a conflict in penalties, in that a second offense under the
state statute was treated more harshly than a second offense
under the city ordinance, it is clear that the Court did
not make this decision based on the difference of penalties.
The Court made its decision based on the fundamental decision
that the city did not have a wide range of additional police
powers not specifically granted in Title 10 Chapter 8 of
the Utah Code.

Obviously the city had a strong argument

that the ordinance was protective of the public health,
safety and morals.

In fact, assuming that the state was

correct in labeling marijuana a dangerous drug in the first
place, such an ordinance on the part of the city may well
\

have exercised the protective functions that the city stated
as justification.

Nevertheless, the ordinance was both beyond

the power of the city to enact, lacking a specific grant of
authority, and was in conflict with state regulations in
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the area.
A. brief reference should be made here to §§76-10-1201
through ·76-10-1226 U.C.A. (1953) as amended, in which the
State of Utah takes a strong stand against public displays of
nudity and other sexual activities.

In this series of statutes

the state legislature recognized that it was enacting a comprehensive scheme of regulation regarding pornography and similar
offense.

It therefore, in § 76-10-1210 specifically gave

authorit~

to the cities to further regulate the materials complained of.
It does not appear the legislature felt that cities would have
such authority without the specific delegation of that statute,
despite the language of §10-8-84 seemingly giving the cities
broad authority to improve the public morals.

The legislature

wanted it clear that cities have the right especially to protect
minors against materials which might otherwise be too readily
available for them.

It was the·intent of the legislature, as

specifically stated·· in §76-10-1210(3) "to give the broadest mean·
ing permissable under the federal and state constitutions to
the words offends public decency' in §76-10-803." Section 76-

10-803 defines a "public nuisance" but note that such broad
l~nguage

is confined to the area of pornography, prqhibited

by the above cited statutes.

No such broad declaration on the

part of the legislature has been enacted to give cities like
authority in the area at issue
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here.

That can only be due to a decision on the part of

the legislature that the conduct they have proscribed with
the proper proscription to be applied to consentual adult
activity in a non-public place.
The public policy of the State of Utah regarding
illegal sexual activity is clearly defined in §76-10-1301
eq seq. U.C.A. (1953) as amended.

Section 76-10-1301 defines

"sexual activity" and ''house of prostitution" as follows:
''Sexual activity'' means intercourse or any
sexual act involving the genitals of one person
and the mouth or anus of another person, regardless of the sex of either participant.
(1)

(2) "House of prostitution" means a plac.e where

prostitution or promotion of prostitution is
regularly carried on by one or more persons
under the control, management, or supervision
of another.

Section 76-10-1302 U.C.A. (1953) as amended, then goes
on to prohibit prostitution in the following words:
(1) A person is guilty of prostitution when:

(a) he engages or offers or agrees to engage
in any sexual activity with another person
for fees; or
(b) is an inmate of a "house of prostitution";
or,
(c) loiters in or within view of any public
place for the purpose of being hired to
engage in sexual activity.

(2)· Prostitution is a class B misdemeanor, provided that any person who was twice convicted
under this section shall be guilty of a class
A misdemeanor.
'
It could easily be argued, under the doctrines set forth
in Layton City vs. Speth, that any regulation of prostitution
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whatsoever on a local level is now void, as being in conflict
with the state law.

The penalty phase, seen as sufficient

conflict in both the Layton City vs. Speth and Allgood vs.
Larsen. cases, must be in dispute, as cities have no power to
pass ordinances punishable on the second offense as a class
"A" misdemeanor.

While the court is not asked here to

determine whether cities have any power under present circumstances to regulate prostitution at all, there is surely a
question presented in this case as to whether cities may
re-define prostitution, thus coming in direct conflict with
state law and depriving state law of its uniform effect,
contrary to Article XI Section 5 and Article I Section 24 of
the Constitution of Utah.

Reference should again be made

here to the fact that the South Salt Lake ordinance at
issue is a copy of an ordinance passed a few months before
the South Salt Lake ordinance, by Salt Lake County.

For

sometime before passing the present county massage ordinance,
Salt Lake County has had in effect §16-23-4 of their
revised ordinances, defining and punishing prostitution.
The act reads as follows:
Section 16-23-4. Prostitution.
(l)· Any female person who performs, solicits
offers or agrees to perform any of the
following acts for money or other consideration commits an act of prostitution:
(a) Any act of sexual intercouse· or
(b) Any act of deviant sexual co~duct.
(2) Deviant sexual conduct for the purpose of
this section means:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-17-

(a) Any act of sexual gratification involving
the sex organs of one person and the mouth
or anus of another.
(b) Any lewd fondling or touching of either
the female erson or male erson with the
intent to arouse or sat1s y t e sexua
desires of either the male erson, female
person, or
(3) A person convicted of prostitution shall be
fined not to exceed $299 or imprisoned in the
county jail not to exceed 6 months, or both.
(Emphasis added).
Salt Lake County, then, has passed an ordinance in· direct
conflict with the prostitution statute of the State of Utah.
In all areas of the state outside of Salt Lake County, prostitution means one thing, and in Salt Lake County, it means
far more.

Even the most tortured reading of the second Allred

decision does not give the county authority'for doing·this.
The fact that the ordinance was

pass~d

long before the new

criminal code defining what prostitution is in the State of
Utah, would seem to read a simply overruling of the county by
the state.

Going back to the second Allred decision, the

majority of the

court~

upon rehearing,

stated~

There is nothing in the state statutes regulating
sexual offenses that evidences any express or
implied intent to preclude local governments
from also attempting to prohibit and supress
the difficult problem of the sex o~fende~.
Therefore, it is our o inion that the cit is
not reclude in enactin the ordinance in
un-ess it 1S inconsistent or in
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The county, in passing their version of §3B-8-5(3)
(their §15-18-5(3)) were restating their obviously invalid
view of prostitution.
massag~

law.

Section 5(3) of the county and city

ordinances is directly in conflict with the state

It is not designed to suppress something the state has

declared to be prostitution.

While the state, in addition

to its prostitution laws, prohibited certain unnatural sex
acts, under the heading of "sodomy" (§76-5-403 U.C.A.) and
also prohibited adultery (§76-7-103 U.C.A.) and fornication
(§76-7-104 U.C.A.) the decision was clearly made that the
conduct defined as prostitution and deviant sexual conduct
by the county, was not a crime.

The county prostitution

ordinance, and this portion of the county massage ordinance,
are not intended to attack "the difficult problem of the
sex offender" because, in fact, a person engaging in the
conduct prohibited

by the ordinance section at issue here

is not a sex offender.
It is appropriate here to refer to the case of In re Lane,
372 P.2d 897 (Calif. 1962) in which the Supreme Court of
California stated as follows:
Defendant was convicted of the crime of
"re.sorting," after a court trial in the
Municipal Court for the Los Angeles Judicial District on two charges of violating
§51.07 of the Los Angeles Municipal Code
which provides: "No person shall resort'
to any off ice building or to any room used
or occupied in connection with, or under
the same rnanagment as any cafe, restaurant
soft drink bar, liquor establishment, or '
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. similar businesses or to any public park
or to any of the buildings therein or to
any vacant lot, rooming house, lodging house,
residence,apartment house, hotel, house
trailer, street or sidewalk for the purpose
of having sexual intercourse with a person
to whom he or she is not married, or for the
purpose of performing or participating in
any lewd act with any such person. 372 P.2d
at 898.
The Court, at page 899 of the decision, lists numerous acts
of sexual intercourse which have been made illegal by the
state, and then goes on to list lewd acts in public places,
crimes against children, indecent exposure, obscene exhibitions and acts against public decency as being outlawed by
the State of California.

Defendant was accused of going

from her own living room to her own bedroom ''for the purpose
of having sexual intercourse with a male to whom she was not
married."

372 P.2d at 898.

In striking down the ordinance,

the court stated:
Although living in a state of cohabitation and
adultery is prohibited, neither simple fornication or adultery alone nor living in a state
of cohabitation and fornication has been made
a crime in this state. (citations omitted)
Accordingly, a city ordinance attempting to
make sexual intercourse between persons not
married to each other criminal is in conflict
with the state law and is void. 372 P.2d at 900.
\

In this state of course, sexual intercourse between unmarried
persons has been made a crime, although rarely enforced.

The

mere touching without sexual conduct, has not been made a
c.rime.

The city may not add numerous new sex crimes to what
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the state legislature has declared is the public policy of
the state.
POINT II
SECTION 3B-8-5 (3) OF THE REVISED ORDINANCES OF SOUTH
SALT LAKE IS INVALID AS DENYIHG EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW
IN VIOLATION OF THE 14th AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES AND ARTICLE I SECTION 2 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.
When Salt Lake County passed Title XV Chapter 18 of its
revised ordinances, its massage ordinance, it appeared to be
prohibiting, in §5 (3)

~

. conduct it had already attempted to

prohibit in §16-23-4 (2) (b), although that ordinance is extremely
vague and over broad.

This ordinance went a step further, however,

in eliminating the requirements that the act is done for a fee
and that it is done with the intent to arouse or satisfy the
sexual desires of either person involved.

The City of South

Salt Lake, by adopting the latter ordinance and not the former,
has clearly prohibited conduct by a masseur that is not prohibiteol
to anyone else in

its confines.'

It is not a crime in the City

of South Salt Lake, or other cities whose ordinances I have
checked, for two consenting adults, married or unmarried, for
a fee or not for a fee, to touch each other wherever they
please, as long as it is not done in a place open to public
view (which would render it "lewdness" in violation of §76-9
702 U.C.A.) and no sexual contact, as defined in State Statute,
results therefrom.

Therefore, if a person is licensed as a
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masseur, he is subject to imprisonment for the same kind
of conduct which any other person may engage in with impunity.
There can be little doubt that a masseur's right to equal
protection of the law under both State and Federal Constitutions
is thereby abridged.

The Supreme Court of Colorado, in People

v. Calvaresi, 534 P.2d 316 (Colo. 1975) stated that
Equal protection of the law is a guarantee of
like treatment of all those who are similarly
situated. Classification of persons under the
criminal law must be under legislation that is
reasonable and not arbitrary. There must be
substantial differences having a reasonable
relationship to the persons involved and the
public purpose to be achieved. 534 P.2d at
318.
Prostitution is prohibited by the State of Utah not only
be.cause it is an offense to the morality of a majority of its
citizens, but because it is a widely known and easily proved
source~of

disease and other social ills.

All prostitution is

prohibited for the same reasons, whether it be in the open on
'
the street, by a sophisticated telephone solicitation system,
in massage parlors or wherever else it may be found.

No such

proof of evil can be shown by the city officials who wish to
stamp out the- conduct at· issue here.

But even assuming that

such could be proved, there is certainly no evidence. anywhere
that such conduct is only offensive and only creates harm when
preformed by licensed masseurs.

Unless the City can show that

prohibiting such conduct only on the part of licensed masseurs
is a classification which has a rational basis, it may not
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-22-

prohibit that conduct which would be legal when performed by
other people, including street prostitutes or call girls.

As

the Supreme Court of California observed, in People v. Romo ,534
P.2d 1015 (Calif. 1975):
The constitutional guaranty of equal protection
of the laws has been judicially defined to mean
that no person or class of persons shall be
denied the same protection of the laws which is
enjoyed by other persons or other classes in
like circumstances in their lives, liberty and
property and in their pursuit of happiness. 534
P.2d at 1020.
This position is also borne out by.·the case of Gilmore v.
Green County Democratic Party Executive Committee, 435 F.2d
487(5th cir. 1970) in which the Federal Circuit Court stated:
As all know, the State Statute or State action
which grants to some what it denies to others,
violated the equal protection provisions of the
Federal Constitution, unless the deprivation is
suffered as the result of the State's placing
persons into different classes, and such classification is a reasonable one. 435 F.2d at 491.
The City Attorney of the City of South Salt Lake, when confronted in the District Court (oral arguments made off the record in
Hollingsworth v. City of South Salt Lake, Supreme Court #16,831)
with this equal protection contention, replied that the City was
prohibiting the conduct in a place where they had trouble with it.
He added, that if they had had trouble with such conduct in
grocery stores, it would have been prohibited there.
of course, avoids the question at hand.
proscribed is legal or it is illegal.
masseurs may be amcng

The argument

Either the conduct
The fact that licensed

those who are most likely to engage in
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the conduct proscribed is not sufficient reason for proscribing
the conduct.

The burden of proof must be on the city to show

that there was indeed some rational basis for singling out
one class of people for criminal liability for conduct not prohibited the general public.
POINT III
SECTION 3B-8-5 (3) OF THE REVISED ORDINANCES OF SOUTH
SALT LAKE IS VOID FOR VAGUENESS.
•

It is a settled rule of law that a statute written so
vaguely that it does not set out a clear standard of the behavior prohibited, is void qs a denial of due process of law,
as guaranteed by the 14th amendment to the United States
Constitution and Article I Section 7 of the
Utah.

Constitut~on

of

That standard was set out, among other places, in

Champlin Refining Company v. Corporation Commissioner 286 U.S.
210, 76 L.Ed. 1062, 52 S.Ct. 559 (1932) where the United States
Supreme Court said:
In light of our decisions it appears upon a mere
inspection that these general words and phrases
are so vague and indefinite that any penalty prescribed for there violation constitutes a denial
of due process of law. It is not the penalty itself that is invalid, but the exaction of ·obedience
to a rule or standard that is so vague and indefinite
as to be really no rule or standard at all. (citations
omitted.) 52 S.Ct. at 568.
In a previous case involving the regulation of massage parlors,
Jensen v. Salt Lake County Board of Commissioners, 530 P.2d 3
(Utah 1974) this court invalidated a county ordinance on the
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The trial court was of the opinion that the
language of the ordinance was so vague and uncertain as to render it invalid. We conclude
that that determination by the trial court was
correct. A person who might wish to enter the
field covered by the ordinance would be unable
to determine from this wording what qualifications
or skill would be necessary to qualify for a
license. It is noted that the ordinances uses
the term'fnassage therapist" but nowhere is that
term defined. 530 P.2d at 4.
Unlike the County Prostitution Ordinance which prohibits
"lewd fondling

•

or touching ... with the intent to arouse or

satisfy the sexual desires .... " and
forcible

~

_- the State Statute on

sexual abuse,(§76-5-404 U.C.A. (1953)

as

amended),

which prohibits_ touching "the genitals of another ... with
the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person,
without the consent of the other person," the ordinance at issue
here does not require any intent.
act to be for compensation.

It also does not require the

This gives lower courts a wide latitul

as to how to interpret the ordinance.

This court, in State v.

Peterson, 560 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1973) ruled that touching for the
purposes of forcible sexual abuse could be done even through a
layer of clothing (at page 1390-1391).
of

Without the requirement

any intent, a masseur may be convicted for brushing past

or bumping into the genitals of a customer, even when the customer
is fully clothed, or is covered with a towel as most customers
are where defendant was employed at the time of this incident.
Reading the ordinance so as not to require any kind of sexual
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vague and overbroad as to constitute the denial of due process
of law.
CONCLUSION
Because the ordinance under which defendant was convicted
is in direct conflict with the several constitutional and statutory
provisions stated above, the court should declare §3B-8-5 (3.) of
the Revised Ordinances of the City of South Salt Lake void and
of no effect, and should order the prosecution of defendant under
tltle named section of the ordinance dismissed and defendant discharged.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ZJ day of July, 1980.
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